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Dear Clerk: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company hereby respectfully brings to the Court's attention 
the recently decided case of Merit Electrical & Instrumentation v. Utah Department of 
Commerce, 271 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Appellate, 8/24/95). A copy of that decision is 
attached hereto. Footnote 1 of that decision reads as follows: 
Both formal and informal proceedings allow for hearings, the 
presentation of evidence, and written orders. However, unlike 
formal proceedings, informal proceedings do not allow for 
discovery or intervention. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-5 to 10 
(1993). Moreover, appeals from formal proceedings go directly 
to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals while appeals from 
informal hearings go to the district court for a trial de novo. See 
id. §§ 63-46b-15, -16. 
Merit Electrical, 271 Utah Adv. Rep. at p.9, n.l. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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function . . . but we do not sit as a panel of 
review on the result, absent some other 
constitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of 
rontons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). It is 
within the discretion of the Board to weigh all 
the evidence before it in deciding whether to 
revoke parole. 
The Board's right to rely on any factors 
known . . . or later adduced at the . . . 
hearing, and the weight to be afforded such 
factors . . . are all matters within the 
discretion of the Board. They are precisely 
•he kinds of issues that are not subject to 
judicial review under section 77-27-5(3). 
Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 
App. 1992), aff'd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993). 
Judicial review by the trial court is therefore 
limited to procedural due process violations 
committed by the Board, Foote, 808 P.2d at 
735, or a clear abuse of the Board's discretion, 
Ward, 573 P.2d at 782. 
In the present case, the trial court overstepped 
its authority when it did not defer to the Board's 
findings and proceeded to reweigh the evidence 
the Board had relied upon at the revocation 
hearing. The Board's decision to revoke parole 
was supported by evidence. Therefore, the 
Board did not abuse its discretion when it 
revoked Walker's parole. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board's decision to revoke Walker's 
parole was within its discretionary authority, and 
was not subject to judicial review. Accordingly, 
the trial court's grant of the extraordinary writ 
is reversed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jnrk«»on, Judg 
Michael J. Wilkin*. Judge 
271 Liah Adv. Rep. * 
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Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Wilkip= 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Merit Electrical, et al. (Merit), petitions fr»* 
review of the order of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing (the 
Division) converting a citation proceeding from 
an informal to a formal proceeding. Because we 
conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider Merit's petition, we do not reach the 
substantive issues. 
BACKGROITNP 
On December 9, 1993, the Division issued 
citations to Merit for hiring unlicensed 
electricians to perform electrical construction 
work at Kennecott Copper in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §58-55-2(32)(c) (1994), Citations 
were also issued to the unlicensed electricians. 
Both Merit and the electricians contested the 
citations. On February 11, 1994, the Division 
filed a motion to convert the citation proceedings 
from informal to formal adjudicative 
proceedings.1 The motion was subsequently 
approved by the Division's presiding hearing 
officer. Merit then appealed the order converting 
the proceedings to the director of the 
Department of Commerce. The director denied 
Merit's request for review, stating that the 
Department did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
request. Merit then petitioned this court fo-
review. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The parties essentially raise four issues for 
review: (1) Does this court have jurisdiction to 
consider Merit's petition? (2) Did the Division 
violate its own rules in converting the 
proceedings? (3) Did the Division fail to satisfy 
the statutory requirements for conversion? (4) 
Does the statute allowing for conversion of 
proceedings violate the Equal Protection Claus* 
of the Utah and United States Constitutions?2 
ANALYSIS 
The Division argues that this court does noi 
have jurisdiction to consider Merit's petition 
because the Division's order converting the 
proceedings to formal adjudicative proceeding* 
was not a final order. We agree. 
Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear * 
petition for review presents a question of la* 
Btain Hudson Frinting v. Tax Convn'n, 870 
PM 291, 292 (Utah App. 1994). 
v<we^ © mcrii lucerne*! ?. Ul 
Prove, Utah 271 Utah 
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals have jurisdiction to review "all final 
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings." Utah Code Ann. §63-d6b-16 
(1993) (emphasis added); see also id. 
§78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994) (this court "has 
jurisdiction to hear appeals of final orders and 
decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies''). This court does 
not have jurisdiction to review orders that 
reserve "something for further decision by the 
agency." Farkdale Care Center v. Frandsen, 
837 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1992) cert, 
denied 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); see also 
Shan v. Board of Review, 78 J P.2d 463,464-65 
(Utah App. 1989). Thus, in Nielson v. Division 
ofT.O.S.T, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1993), 
this court held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
review the actions of the Division of Police 
Officer Standards and Training regarding a 
wildlife officer, since the Division had 
conducted no formal proceedings from which the 
petitioner could seek review. Id. at 1204. 
Similarly, in the present case, neither formal 
nor informal proceedings have occurred 
regarding the merits of the contested citations. 
The decision converting the proceedings is not 
"final agency action" because the formal 
adjudicative proceedings have yet to take place. 
Therefore, the conversion decision "reserves 
something to the agency for further decision." 
Sloan, 781 P.2d at 464. 
Nevertheless, Merit argues that this court can 
consider the petition if it adopts the "Collateral 
Order Doctrine." That doctrine allows review of 
orders that "'conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue completely 
separate from the merits of the action, and (are) 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final 
judgment.'" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 
742, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697 (1982) (citation 
omitted). The doctrine is intended to allow 
courts to review orders which "finally determine 
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, 
rights asserted in the action, too important to be 
denied review and too independent of the cause 
itself to require that appellate consideration be 
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp,, 337 
U.S. 541, 546/69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 (1949). 
Although judicial economy might be served in 
this case if we were to adopt the doctrine, we 
decline to do so. The Utah Legislature has made 
its intent clear with regard to this court's 
jurisdiction over appeals from administrative 
agency actions. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act provides in part that the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have 
jurisdiction to "review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." 
Utah Code. Ann. §63-46b-t6 (1993) (emphasis 
added); see also id. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 
1994). Any deviation from the requirement for 
final agency action must also come from the 
l^e»islatnr*» 5 
ft Dent, or Commerce 
lv. Rep, t 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Division's order t^»n *»rttng -
citation proceedings from infonnnl to formal i 
not "final agency action," ne lack jurisdiction i< 
hear Merit's petition. Wo fi«nh#»r decline \? 
adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judg-
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Presiding Judg *> 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
1. Both formal and informal proceedings allow fr»' 
hearings, the presentation of evidence, and written 
orders However, unlike formal proceedings, infnrmnl 
proceedings do
 y not allow, for discover)' or 
intervention. See Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-5to 
10 (1993) Moreover, appeal* from forma' 
proceedings go directly to the Supreme Court or Cour* 
of Appeals while appeals from informal hearings go to 
the district court for a trial de novo. See id §§63-46h 
15,-16. 
2. As explained earlier in this opinion, because v-e 
conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to conside* 
the petition, we do not reach the remaining hsuc 
regarding the conversion order 
3. We note that the Collateral Order Doctrine **« 
adopted hy the various courts cited in Merit v 
Memorandum In Opposition To Summary Disposition 
ha* be«n applied only to proceedings before trial 
courts and not, as the case here, to proceedings 
conducted before administrative ngenci«*s. See Dipt fa' 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc , 62 U S L W 
4457 (U.S. June 6, 1994); Moses H Cone J1o<r v 
Mercury Constr Corp , 460 U.S I. 103 S Ct. 92* 
(1983); Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 U S 731, 102 S Ct 
2690 (1982); Cohen v Benefictal Indus. Loan Corp 
337 U S 541, 69 S C t . 1221 (1949); United States \ 
Deffenbaugh Indus., 957 V 2d 749 (10th Cir. 1992i 
In re NewportSa\ing%andLoam Ast'n, 928 T 2d 4" 
(1st Cir. 1991); Town ofCheutpcake Beach v /Yr*« 
Constr Co., 625 A.2d I<V* *•• -Q93); K «* 
Ifampe, 626 A.2d 1218 (!"«• 1903) 
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JURISDICTION AND COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. The Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, entered 
an order of dismissal in favor of defendants Industrial 
Commission of Utah Anti-discrimination Division and Felix Jensen 
on April 28, 1994. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company ("State Farm") filed a notice of appeal on May 26, 1994. 
[This action will be hereinafter referred to as the "Jensen 
action."] 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Frank G. 
Noel presiding, entered an order of dismissal in favor of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah Anti-discrimination Division and 
Brenda Mena on May 24, 1994. State Farm filed a notice of appeal 
on May 24, 1994. [This action will hereinafter be referred to as 
the "Mena action."] 
The respective cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal 
by an order dated July 21, 1994, issued by the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Was State Farm required to request an evidentiary hearing 
from the director of the Industrial Commission as its only method 
of review of the Determination and Order issued as a result of 
the informal adjudicative proceeding? In other words, was State 
Farm required to request an evidentiary hearing before the 
director of the Industrial Commission or could State Farm allow 
1 
the informal adjudication to become a final order and then seek 
a trial de novo in the district court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court reviews the trial court's dismissal of State 
Farm's complaint for correctness, giving no deference to the 
trial court's legal conclusions. First Sec. Bank of Utah v. 
Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993). The same lack of defer-
ence applies to the trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
which likewise pose questions of law. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 
497, 499 (Utah 1989); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
The issue of whether an agency has issued final agency action is 
reviewed independently by this court. Parkdale Care Center v. 
Frandson, 837 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
1. Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-l et seq., specifically Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-5, 63-46b-
12, 63-46b-14, 63-46b-15, 63-46b-16. Addendum, Exhibit A. 
2. Utah Anti-discrimination Act, § 34-35-1 et seq., 
specifically Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1. Addendum, Exhibit B. 
3. Utah Anti-discrimination Division Administrative Rules, 
R560-1 et seq. Addendum, Exhibit C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
State Farm is requesting review of the district courts' 
dismissal of its complaints in both these cases on the basis that 
State Farm failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
2 
After informal investigations were conducted by the 
Industrial Commission in both actions, which resulted in findings 
adverse to State Farm, State Farm elected to allow the informal 
decisions of the Industrial Commission to become final agency 
actions and then seek a trial de novo in the district courts 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. In dismissing State 
Farm's complaint in both actions, the district courts held that 
State Farm had not exhausted its administrative remedies by 
requesting an evidentiary hearing which was available to it and 
thereafter requesting an intra-agency review of the results of 
that evidentiary hearing as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1. 
State Farm contends that the district courts erred in their 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 by failing to 
construe this statute so as to give effect to the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. 
The statutory scheme embodied in the Utah Anti-discrimination Act 
and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act sets forth two options 
for a party who is adversely affected by an informal adjudicative 
decision. The first option is to seek an agency evidentiary 
hearing and thus convert the informal adjudication to a formal 
adjudication. The second option is to opt out of the 
administrative process and request a trial de novo in the 
district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. The 
district courts in both actions held that the second option did 
not exist. This conclusion is erroneous because it ignores the 
3 
Administrative Procedures Act and focuses solely on the 
provisions of the Utah Anti-discrimination Act, thus failing to 
harmonize the provisions of both statutory schemes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The specific facts applicable to both cases which have been 
consolidated for purposes of appeal are set forth below. 
A. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Felix Jensen 
1. On March 23, 1993, Felix Jensen filed a request for 
agency action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1). [R. 
07.] The Commission performed an investigation. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.1(3). The proceedings were conducted informally and 
according to the rules enacted under the Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. and the Anti-
discrimination Act, § 34-35-1 et seq., the proceeding was an 
informal proceeding as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l). 
[R. 07-011] 
2. The investigator for the Commission claimed to have 
uncovered sufficient evidence to support allegations of 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.1(5)(a). In accordance with recommendations of the 
investigator, the Commission issued a Determination and Order on 
July 15, 1993, finding that State Farm had violated the Utah 
Anti-discrimination Act. [R. 07-011; 012-013] 
4 
3. In the July 15, 1993, order, the Commission provided the 
following notice of State Farm's right of administrative or 
judicial review as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i): 
As per § 34-35-7.1(5) (c) , U.C.A., the non-
prevailing party may make a written request to 
the Director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the Director's Determination 
and Order. . . . Such request must be 
submitted within thirty (30) days of the date 
of the issuance of the order. 
If the director receives no timely request for 
hearing, this order becomes the final order of 
the Commission with no further right of appeal 
as specified in § 34-35-7.1(5)(d). 
[R. 013] 
4. State Farm did not request an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's Determination and Order. Any such 
request was due August 14, 1993. 
5. On August 14, 1993, the Order and Determination became 
a final appealable order of the Commission. The order was not a 
final order of the Commission until the time for requesting an 
evidentiary hearing had expired.1 
'Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5) provides as follows: 
(5)(a) If the initial attempts at 
settlement are unsuccessful and the 
investigator uncovers sufficient evidence 
during his investigation to support the 
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice set out in the request for 
agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's 
report the director may issue a determination 
and order based on the investigator's report. 
5 
6. On September 13, 1993, State Farm filed a petition for 
judicial review in the Third Judicial District Court of the final 
agency action. [R. 02-014] 
7. The petition was filed within thirty (30) days after the 
Order and Determination became a final order of the Commission. 
8. On September 23, 1993, the Commission filed a motion to 
dismiss State Farm's complaint for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) and for 
failure to timely file the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3). [R. 017-023] 
9. The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable John A. 
Rokich presiding, granted the Commission's motion to dismiss by 
an order dated April 28, 1994 holding that State Farm had failed 
to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.1, and that therefore the court lacked jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of State Farm's complaint. [R. 0112-
0117; Addendum, Exhibit D] 
10. State Farm filed a timely notice of appeal on May 26, 
1994. [R. 0119-0120] 
(c) A party may file a written reguest 
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date of the 
determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely 
reguest for a hearing, the determination and 
the order received by the director reguiring 
the respondent to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice and to provide 
relief to the aggrieved party becomes the 
final order of the commission. 
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B. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Indus, Comm'n of 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Brenda Mena 
1. On March 2, 1993, Brenda Mena filed a request for agency 
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1). [R. 07] The 
Commission performed an investigation. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1(3). The proceedings were conducted informally and according 
to the rules enacted under the Administrative Procedures Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. and the Anti-discrimination 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq., the proceeding was an 
informal proceeding as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l). 
[R. 07-020] 
2. The investigator for the Commission claimed to have 
uncovered sufficient evidence to support allegations of a 
discriminatory employment practice. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1(5)(a). In accordance with the recommendation of the 
investigator, the Commission issued a Determination and Order on 
July 6, 1993, that State Farm had violated the Utah Anti-
discrimination Act. [R. 07-020; 021-022] 
3. In the July 6, 1993, Order, the Commission provided the 
following notice of State Farm's right of administrative or 
judicial review as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) : 
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a 
written request for a formal hearing must be 
filed with the Director of the Division within 
thirty (30) days from the date of the issuance 
of this order as specified in Section 34-35-
7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule 
R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. . . . If the director 
receives no timely request for a hearing, this 
order becomes the final order of the 
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Commission with no further rights of appeal as 
specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), U.C.A. 
[R. 022] 
4. State Farm did not request an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the Director's Determination and Order. Such a 
request was due August 5, 1993. 
5. On August 5, 1993, the Order and Determination became a 
final appealable order of the Commission. The order was not a 
final order of the Commission until the time for requesting an 
evidentiary hearing had expired. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5). 
6. On September 1, 1993, State Farm filed a petition for 
judicial review of the final agency action in the Third Judicial 
District Court. [R. 02-023] 
7. The petition was filed within thirty (30) days after the 
Order and Determination became a final order of the Commission. 
8. On September 23, 1993, the Commission filed a motion to 
dismiss State Farm's complaint for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) and for 
failure to timely file the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3). [R. 028-034] Brenda Mena also filed a motion to 
dismiss on the same basis on November 13, 1993. [R. 091-099] 
9. By an order dated May 24, 1994, the trial court granted 
the defendant's motion to dismiss. [R. 0138-144; Addendum, 
Exhibit E] 
10. State Farm filed a timely notice of appeal on June 2, 
1994. [R. 0149-150] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 specifies the investigatory and 
adjudicative procedures to be utilized by the Industrial 
Commission, Anti-discrimination Division in investigating and 
processing a charge of discrimination. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1(l)-(5) sets forth the framework for an informal adjudicative 
proceeding following a charge of discrimination. After the in-
formal adjudicative process is complete, and after the Commission 
has entered a Determination and Order relative to the charge of 
discrimination, an adversely affected party seeking to contest 
the Determination and Order has the option of (1) requesting an 
evidentiary hearing and thereby converting the process into a 
formal adjudicative proceeding, or (2) allowing the informal 
adjudicative Determination and Order to become a final order and 
thereafter seek a trial de novo in the district court. Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5). Here, both trial courts erred in holding 
that State Farm failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by 
not requesting an evidentiary hearing before the Industrial Com-
mission prior to seeking a trial de novo in the district court. 
Appellees also argue that State Farm's respective appeals to 
the district court were not timely. However, under both the 
Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah Anti-discrimination 
Act, State Farm was not able to appeal to the district court 
until the agency action became final. An order and determination 
does not become a final order of the Commission until 30 days 
after it is issued. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 . 1 ( 4 )( c)-(d) . State 
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Farm timely appealed from the final agency actions by filing its 
petitions for judicial review within 30 days after the orders 
became final orders of the Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
STATE FARM WAS ENTITLED TO SEEK A TRIAL DE NOVO IN THE 
DISTRICT COURTS AFTER THE INFORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS 
SPECIFIED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-7.1(l)-(5) RESULTED 
IN A FINAL ORDER. 
The resolution of this appeal involves the interpretation and 
interrelation of provisions of the Utah Anti-discrimination Act, 
§ 34-35-1 et seq., the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § £° *t seq., and the Utah Anti-discrimination 
Division Admi.. ,. ^ auive Rules, R 560-1 et seq. The issue before 
this Court is whether a party who receives an adverse Determina-
tion and Order pursuant to the informal adjudicative process set 
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1)-(5) is permitted to allow 
that order to become a final order, and then seek de novo review 
in the district court or whether that party's appellate review is 
limited to an evidentiary hearing before the agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 sets forth the procedure 
applicable to a discrimination claim. This code section provides 
in pertinent part: 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to 
file claim — Investigations — 
Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement — Reconsideration — 
Determination. 
•k "k "k 
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(4) (a) If the initial attempts at set-
tlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator 
uncovers insufficient evidence during his 
investigation to support the allegations of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request for agency 
action, the investigator shall formally report 
these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's 
report, the director may issue a determination 
and order for dismissal of the adjudicative 
proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request 
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date of the 
determination and order for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely 
request for a hearing, the determination and 
order issued by the director becomes the final 
order of the commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at set-
tlement are unsuccessful and the investigator 
uncovers sufficient evidence during his 
investigation to support the allegations of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request for agency 
action, the investigator shall formally report 
these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's 
report the director may issue a determination 
and order based on the investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request 
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date of the 
determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely 
request for a hearing, the determination and 
order issued by the director requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice and to provide 
relief to the aggrieved party becomes the 
final order of the commission. 
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The procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 .1 (1)-(5) 
are specifically defined as informal adjudicative proceedings. 
R. 560-1-3(f)2 In both the Mena and Jensen actions, State Farm 
complied with the procedures specified in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1(l)-(5). After an adverse Determination and Order was entered 
against State Farm, State Farm allowed the 30-day time period 
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5) to expire which 
resulted in the Determination and Order becoming a final order of 
the Commission. At that point, State Farm requested a trial de 
novo pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal ad-
judicative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have 
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all 
final agency actions resulting from informal 
adjudicative proceedings, except that the 
juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over 
all state agency actions relating to removal 
or placement decisions regarding children in 
state custody. [Emphasis added] 
Clearly, the Anti-discrimination Act, when read in 
conjunction and harmonized with the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, sets forth a statutory scheme which gives an 
2F. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDINGS FOR PURPOSE OF UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), 
U.C.A., the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)-(5), 
U.C.A., are an informal process with no hearing and are governed by 
Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement conferences scheduled 
pursuant to Section 34-35-7.1(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative 
hearings. 
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adversely affected party two options in respect to seeking 
further review of the Determination and Order. First, the party 
can choose to allow the Determination and Order to become a final 
order and seek a trial de novo in the district court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. This is the option State Farm chose 
in both actions. In the alternative, the adversely affected 
party can request an evidentiary hearing and convert the informal 
process into a formal adjudicative hearing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (6)-(10) sets forth the formal 
adjudicative process which is available to a party following an 
adverse determination in the informal adjudicative process set 
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (1)-(5) / The specific 
provisions of the Anti-discrimination Act setting forth the 
formal adjudicative process are as follows: 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to 
file claim — Investigations — 
Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement — Reconsideration — 
Determination. 
•k "k "k 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the 
investigator who investigated the matter may 
not participate in a hearing except as a 
witness, nor may he participate in the 
deliberations of the presiding officer. 
;Utah Anti-discrimination Division Administrative Rule R560-1-5 
provides in pertinent part: 
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 34-35-
7.1(6)-(10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative hearing 
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(7) Prior to commencement of an eviden-
tiary hearing, the party filing the request 
for agency action may reasonably and fairly 
amend any allegation, and the respondent may 
amend its answer. Those amendments may be 
made during or after a hearing but only with 
permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If upon all the evidence at a 
hearing, the presiding officer finds that a 
respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice, the pre-
siding officer shall issue an order dismissing 
the request for agency action containing the 
allegation of a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice. 
(b) the presiding officer may order that 
the respondent be reimbursed by the complain-
ing party for his attorney's fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the 
hearing, the presiding officer finds that a 
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice, the presiding 
officer shall issue an order requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice and to provide 
relief to the complaining party, including 
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is 
to be urged and facilitated at all stages of 
the adjudicative process. 
Thus it is clear that both informal and formal adjudicative 
proceedings are provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 35-34-7.1. In 
granting both defendants' motions to dismiss, the district courts 
in essence held that the informal adjudicative procedures set 
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7. 1 (1)-(5) were merely pre-
requisites to a mandatory formal adjudicative process set forth 
at Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 . 1 ( 6 )-(10 ) . The trial courts erred in 
this conclusion. 
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In setting forth a party's options in respect to appealing an 
adverse Determination and Order issued in the informal adjudica-
tive proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c)-(d) provides as 
follows: 
(c) A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determina-
tion and order within 30 days of the date 
of the determination and order, 
[Emphasis added] 
(d) If the director receives no timely 
request for hearing, the determination 
and order issued by the director 
requiring a respondent to cease any 
discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the 
aggrieved party becomes a final order of 
the Commission. 
This code provision unambiguously provides that the decision 
to request an evidentiary hearing is optional. If a voluntary 
evidentiary hearing is not requested, the Determination and Order 
issued as a result of the informal adjudicative proceeding 
becomes a final order. This final order is therefore subject to 
judicial review as specified in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.' 
4These sections provide as follows: 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except 
that: 
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(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or 
any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking 
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any 
or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are 
inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result 
in irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion. 
(3)(a) A party shall file a petition for 
judicial review of final agency action within 30 
days after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued or is considered to 
have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and 
all other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal 
adj udicative proceedings. 
(l)(a) The district courts have jurisdiction 
to review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, 
except that the juvenile courts have jurisdiction 
over all state agency actions relating to removal 
or placement of children in state custody and 
actions relating to the support of those children 
as determined administratively under Section 78-3a-
49. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in 
the statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where the 
petitioner resides or maintains his principal place 
of business. 
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The Industrial Commission argues that State Farm is precluded 
from seeking a trial de novo in the district court because it did 
(2)(a) The petition for judicial review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings shall be a 
complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final 
agency action to be reviewed, together with a 
duplicate copy, summary, or brief description 
of the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who 
were parties in the informal adjudicative 
proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order 
from the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying 
the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(vii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings 
in the district court are governed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3)(a) The district court, without a jury, 
shall determine all questions of fact and law and 
any constitutional issue presented in the 
pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in 
judicial proceedings under this section. 
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not exhaust its administrative remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-15. As stated previously, the governing statutes do not 
suggest that a written request to the director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the director's Determination and Order 
is a mandatory pre-requisite to judicial review of the informal 
adjudicative proceeding. The language of the statute clearly 
states that the request for an evidentiary hearing is optional.5 
If a request for an evidentiary hearing is filed pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5), the proceeding 
is converted from an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. After conversion to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding, the only judicial review available to an 
aggrieved party is through the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Once a request 
for an evidentiary hearing is timely filed and the proceeding is 
converted from an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding, there is no way for a party to obtain 
district court review. To require State Farm to request an 
evidentiary hearing with the agency, in effect nullifying the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-15, deprives State Farm of its right to pursue the district 
court route of review of the agency determination and order. 
5
"A party may file a written request to the director for an 
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date of the determination and 
order." [Emphasis added] Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c). 
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In Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 
1991), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether a party was 
required to exhaust administrative remedies. Although Heinecke 
involved a formal adjudicative process, the court's reasoning is 
instructive to the resolution of the instant action. In 
Heinecke, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies because he did not seek review of the Division's 
determination by the head of the Department of Commerce. 
In finding that the plaintiff did not need to seek review of 
the Division's determination prior to obtaining judicial review, 
the Utah Court of Appeals examined Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 and 
held as follows: 
[N]o provision in the statutes governing the 
Division appears to provide for review beyond 
the divisional level as contemplated in 
Section 12(1)(a) of UAPA, which review would 
in any case be optional so as not to defeat 
finality for the purposes of judicial review 
given the "permanent" and "may" usages of the 
section, nor is any mandatory review provided 
for as contemplated in Section 12(3). 
Id. at 463. 
State Farm exhausted all administrative remedies applicable 
to the informal adjudicative process. If State Farm was required 
to exhaust all administrative remedies by requesting an eviden-
tiary hearing before the Commission, the proceeding would have 
become a formal proceeding, rendering the statute relating to 
judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings meaningless 
and thereby creating a conflict between the Anti-discrimination 
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Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. Utah law is clear 
that "when the construction of an act will bring it into serious 
conflict with another act," the court has a duty to "construe the 
acts to be in harmony and to avoid conflicts." Sullivan v. 
Scoular Grain Company of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1993); 
Jerez v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991) 
[citations omitted]. 
The district courts' interpretation of the Anti-
discrimination Act essentially reads out of existence the 
informal adjudicative procedures specified in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.l(l)-(5)f Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-15. It is an elementary principle of statutory 
construction that a statute should be construed as a whole giving 
effect to all of its provisions. Under the district courts' 
interpretation, all Anti-discrimination agency actions must be 
formal adjudications and judicially reviewable only as provided 
in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. To so hold totally voids and 
holds for naught the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 and deprives a party of the right to 
ever have an informal adjudicative order reviewed by the district 
court. This is clearly not what the statutes contemplate. This 
court should give effect to the entire statutory scheme. 
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POINT II. 
STATE FARM'S APPEALS WERE TIMELY FILED WITH THE DISTRICT 
COURTS. 
In the proceedings below, the defendants/appellees also 
argued that State Farm's appeals were untimely. Although the 
trial courts' dismissal of State Farm's petitions were not based 
on this argument, State Farm feels compelled to briefly address 
this issue. State Farm filed petitions for judicial review of 
the final agency actions within 30 days after the Order and 
Determinations became final orders of the Commission. State Farm 
was statutorily unable to appeal to the district court prior to 
the expiration of the 30-day period because, before then, the 
orders did not constitute final agency action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c)-(d) specifically provides as 
follows: 
(c) A party may file a written request 
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date of the 
determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely 
request for a hearing, the determination and 
order issued by the director requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice and to provide 
relief to the aggrieved party becomes the 
final order of the commission. 
This section of the statute clearly states that an informal 
adjudicative order becomes final 30 days after it is issued if no 
timely request for an evidentiary hearing is made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a) provides as follows: 
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The district courts have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency 
actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings, except that the juvenile courts 
have jurisdiction over all state agency 
actions relating to removal or placement of 
children in state custody in actions relating 
to the support of those children as determined 
administratively under § 78-3a-49. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) provides: 
A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action within 30 days 
after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued or is considered 
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-
13(3)(b). 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 and the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and § 63-46b-15 can 
easily be harmonized by construing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(3)(a) to mean that the petition for review of final agency 
action must be filed within 30 days after the order constituting 
the final agency action "becomes final." By doing so, this court 
gives full effect to the Utah Anti-discrimination Act (Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq.) as v/ell as the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq.). The district 
courts did not do so and in effect read out of existence the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act provisions relating to judicial 
review by the district court of informal administrative orders. 
State Farm could not appeal to the district court until the 
agency action became final. The Order and Determination in both 
cases did not become final orders until 30 days had elapsed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(d). State Farm timely appealed 
22 
from the final agency action by filing its petitions for judicial 
review within 30 days after the Orders became final orders of the 
Commission. As such, State Farm's appeals were in all respects 
timely and in accordance with all statutory reguirements. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, State Farm hereby reguests that 
this court reverse the district courts' dismissal of State Farm's 
complaint in both the Jensen and the Mena actions and remand both 
cases for trials de novo in the district court. 
DATED this 3L3 day of December, 1994. 
STRONG & HANNI 
^<^r 
nni ^ -J 
Robert L. Janicki 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
.!06S40nh 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-l, et seq. 
CHAPTER 46b 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
Section Section 
63-46b-0.5. Short title. 63-46b-10. 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chap-
ter. 63-46b-ll. 
63-46b-2. Definitions. 63-46b-12. 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative 63-46b-13. 
proceedings. 
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative pro- 63-46b-14. 
ceedings as informal — Stan-
dards — Undesignated pro- 63-46b-15. 
ceedings formal. 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudi- 63-46b-16. 
cative proceedings. 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudica- 63-46b-17. 
tive proceedings — Respon-
sive pleadings. 63-46b-18. 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudica-
tive proceedings — Discovery 
and subpoenas. 63-46b-l(J. 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudica- 63-46b-20. 
tive proceedings — Hearing 
procedure. 63-46b-21. 
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudica- G3-46b-22. 
tive proceedings — Interven-
tion. 
Procedures for formal adjudica-
tive proceedings — Orders. 
Default. 
Agency review — Procedure. 
Agency review — Reconsider-
ation. 
Judicial review — Exhaustion 
of administrative remedies. 
Judicial review — Informal ad-
judicative proceedings. 
Judicial review — Formal adju-
dicative proceedings. 
Judicial review — Type of re-
lief. 
Judicial review — Stay and 
other temporary remedies 
pending final disposition. 
Civil enforcement. 
Emergency adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
Declaratory orders. 
Transition procedures. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-l 
63-46b-0.5. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Administrative Procedures Act." 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by 
a s tatute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this 
chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and 
govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal rights, duties, 
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons, including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, 
modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of these actions. 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
(a) the procedures for making agency rules, or the judicial review of 
those procedures or rules; 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, the 
decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of and 
penalties or interest on taxes, or the issuance of any tax assessment, 
except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by a 
taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity or 
correctness of those actions; 
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the granting of 
pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the 
rescission, termination, or revocation of parole or probation, to actions and 
decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge, 
conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the 
discipline of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or 
the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the Utah 
State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or persons in the 
custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health, or persons on 
probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions: 
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reas-
sign, or promote students or teachers in any school or educational 
institution, or judicial review of those actions: 
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(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions within 
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those 
actions; 
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Title 35, Chapter 9, 
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, except that this chapter governs any 
agency action commenced by the employer, licensee, or other person-
authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the citation or 
assessment; 
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, the 
management and disposal of school and institutional trust land assets, 
except that this chapter governs any agency's final action commenced by 
any person pursuant to Section 65A-1-7, and contracts for the purchase or 
sale of products, real property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the 
state, or by or for an agency of the state, except as provided in those 
contracts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and 
Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions; and Title 7, Chapter 2, 
Possession of Depository Institution by Commissioner; Title 7, Chapter 19, 
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or Holding Companies; and 
Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review 
of those actions; 
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits, the initial determination of any person's eligibility for 
benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, and Title 35, 
Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, or the initial determination of 
a persons unemployment tax liability; 
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of mone-
tary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, develop-
ment, or the arts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under Title 26, 
Chapter 8, Utah Emergency Medical Services System Act; Title 19, 
Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act; Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water 
Act; Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, Underground 
Storage Tank Act; or Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management 
Act, except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by any 
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the notice 
or order; 
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal statute or 
regulation to be conducted according to federal procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for government 
or public assistance benefits; 
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and 
certificates of registration; 
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and 
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603. 
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
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(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an 
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative pro-
ceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and interested 
persons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(hi) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that the 
requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not 
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section. 
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings r^thorized by Section 
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting 
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if 
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any 
provision of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to 
an agency of the state from the federal government, the applicability of 
those provisions to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary 
to prevent the denial. 
(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature 
at its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent 
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, 
for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period 
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial 
review. 
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63-46b-2. Definitions-
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency action or proceeding 
described in Section 63-46b-l. 
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer, 
council, office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this 
state, including the agency head, agency employees, or other persons 
acting on behalf of or under the authority of the agency head, but does not 
mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision 
of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of the 
state. 
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of individuals in whom 
the ultimate legal authority of the agency is vested by statute. 
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized and gov-
erned by Section 63-46b-21. 
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification, approval, regis-
tration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by statute. 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudica-
tive proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding 
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by stat-
ute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
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(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, partnership, 
corporation, association, political subdivision or its units, governmental 
subdivision or its units, public or private organization or entity of any 
character, or another agency. 
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an individual or 
body of individuals designated by the agency head, by the agency's 
rules, or by statute to conduct an adjudicative proceeding. — 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an agency may 
substitute one presiding officer for another during any proceeding, 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one phase of a 
proceeding need not continue as presiding officer through all phases 
of a proceeding. 
(i) "Respondent" means a person against whom an adjudicative pro-
ceeding is initiated, whether by an agency or any other person. 
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to 
review the orders of another agency. 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the 
names or titles of the agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility 
for adjudicative proceedings before the agency. 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative 
proceedings shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the 
agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by per-
sons other than the agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the 
following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presid-
ing officer, and shall include: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice 
is being given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mail-
ing address of any attorney or employee who has been designated to 
appear for the agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules adopted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the 
provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
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(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that 
each respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the 
mailing date of the notice of agency action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any 
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing 
is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in the hearing may be held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing 
is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and 
may be requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a 
statement that the parties may request a hearing within the time 
provided by the agency's rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under 
which the adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the 
presiding officer; and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, 
to the extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be 
decided, 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the 
agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has a 
right to notice under statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than 
the agency to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for 
agency action shall be in writing and signed by the person invoking the 
jurisdiction of the agency, or by his representative, and shall include: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the 
request for agency action is being sent: 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed; 
(IV) a statement oi the legal authority and jurisdiction under 
which agency action is requested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency: and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief 
or agency action. 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the 
agency''and shall send a copy by mail to each person known to have a 
direct interest in the requested agency action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more printed forms 
eliciting the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the 
request for agency action when completed and filed by the person request-
ing agency action. . 
(d) The presiding'officer shall promptly review a request for agency 
action and shall: ' 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is 
granted and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed: 
296 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-3 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is de-
nied and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that 
the party may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the 
denial; or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are re-
quired to determine the agency's response to the request, 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the 
information required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to dis-
closure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of this section. 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) 
to all parties, except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) 
may be published when publication is required by statute. 
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall: 
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(B) give the name of the proceeding; 
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules enacted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation to the appli-
cable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to 
the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where 
respondent parties are known, state that a written response 
must be filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's notice if 
mailed, or within 30 days of the last publication date of the 
agency's notice, if published; 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hear-
ing is to be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding, state the 
time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which 
the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in 
default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a hear-
ing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by 
rule and may be requested by a party within the time prescribed 
by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing and the time 
within which a hearing may be requested under the agency's 
rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone num-
ber of the presiding officer. " " . • 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this 
chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or 
actions are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency 
action seeking review must be filed with the agency within the time pre-
scribed by the agency's rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by 
rule, provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may 
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable 
federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, applications for 
licenses filed under authority of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not 
considered to be a request for agency action under this chapter. 
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formal — Standards — Undesignated proceed-
ings formal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceed-
ings to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if: 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural 
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter; — 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceed-
ings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will 
be enhanced by categorizations; and • 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential 
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative pro-
ceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's 
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding, 
the presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an infor-
mal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a for-
mal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights 
of any party. 
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63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudica-
tive proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by 
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include 
the following: 
(a) Unless the agency hv rule provides for and requires a response, no 
answer or other pleading responsive to the allegations contained in the 
notice of agency action or the request for agency action need be filed. 
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, or i( a hearing is permitted by rule and is requested by a party 
within the time prescribed by rule. 
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of agency action or 
in the request for agency action shall be permitted to testify, present 
evidence, and comment on the issues. 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties. 
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency may issue subpoenas or 
other orders to compel production of necessary evidence. 
(0 All parties shall have access to information contained in the 
agency's files and to all materials and information gathered in any inves-
tigation, to the extent permitted by law. 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except tha t the agency may enact rules 
permitting intervention where a federal s tatute or rule requires that a 
state permit intervention. 
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding, the presiding officer shall issue a signed order m writing that 
states the following: 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative or judicial review avail-
able to the parties", and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review. 
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the facts appearing in 
the agency's files and on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings. 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be promptly mailed to 
each of the parties. 
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing. 
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a reporter approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript from the agency's record of the hearing. 
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(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or 
power given to an agency by another statute. 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Responsive pleadings. 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule accord-
ing to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a 
written response signed by the respondent or his representative within 30 
days of the mailing date or last date o( publication o[ the notice of agency 
action or the notice under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks; 
(d) a statement of the facts; and 
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief requested 
should be granted. 
(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and one copy shall be sent by 
mail to each party. 
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit or require 
pleadings in addition to the notice of agency action, the request for agency 
action, and the response. All papers permitted or required to be filed shall be 
filed with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to each party. 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Discovery and subpoenas. 
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency may, by rule, prescribe 
means of discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all relevant infor-
mation necessary to support their claims or defenses. If the agency does not 
enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the 
production of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by 
the presiding officer when requested by any party, or may be issued by the 
presiding officer on his own motion. 
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(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or 
power given to an agency by another statute. 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Hearing procedure, 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (n), in all formal 
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows-
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to 
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding offi-
cer: 
(1) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious; 
(n) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(in) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or 
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document, 
(IV) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially 
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record ot other 
proceedings before the agencv, and of technical or scientific (acts 
within the agency's specialized knowledge 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is 
hearsay 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudica-
tive proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing 
(f) Al] testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be 
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that 
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential infor-
mation disclosed at the hearing 
(1) All hearings shall be open to all parties 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appro-
priate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing 
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63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene 
in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes 
to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall 
include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the proceeding; 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights 
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceed-
ing, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision 
of law; and 
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency. 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he deter-
mines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice* and the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in 
writing and sent by mail to the petitioner and each party. 
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the 
intervener's participation m the adjudicative proceeding that are neces-
sary for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceed-
ing. 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after 
the intervention. 
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63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any 
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time 
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based ex-
clusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or 
on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the 
order available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, 
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hear-
say evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing 
interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the 
issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adju-
dicative proceeding. 
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(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in 
the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or partici-
pate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a re-
sponse under Section 63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default 
and shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default 
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to 
the default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be 
made to the presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-46b-12, 
or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the 
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudi-
cative proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of 
default, conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adju-
dicative proceeding without the participation of the party in default and 
shall determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those 
affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the 
agency and the party in defaXilt, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 
63-46b-12. Agency review — P r o c e d u r e . 
ll) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity desig-
nated for that purpose by the statute or rule, 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
dii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
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(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within 
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the 
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties 
and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the 
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the 
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the 
agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule 
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other 
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or appli-
cable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a w-ritten order on 
review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a 
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring re-
view; 
di) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be 
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
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63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which 
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is 
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not 
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one 
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue 
a written order granting the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does 
not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the 
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
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63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The distnct courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all 
final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, 
except that the juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all state agency 
actions relating to removal or placement of children in state custody and 
actions relating to the support of those children as determined adminis-
tratively under Section 78 3a-49 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, m the absence of 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains his principal place of business 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall include 
(I) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial 
review, 
(n) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency, 
(m) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, 
together with a duplicate copy summary, or brief description of the 
agency action, 
(IV) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agencv action 
(v) a cop> of the written agencv order fiom the informal proceeding, 
<vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
entitled to obtain judicial review 
(vu) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested, and 
(vni) a statement ot the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section 
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a pptition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that. 
(a) all parties to the leview proceedings ma\ stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organ]/e the record, 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of prepaung transcripts and 
copies for the record 
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a 'higher court, if authorized by statute. 
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63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary 
remedies pending final disposition, 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant a stay of its 
order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, ac-
cording to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporary remedies 
unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies re-
quested by a party, the agency's order of denial shall be mailed to all parties 
and shall specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary remedy was not 
granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the 
public health, safety, or welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail on the 
merits when the court finally disposes of the matter; 
(n) the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury 
without immediate relief; 
(m) granting relief to the party seeking review will not substan-
tially harm other parties to the proceedings; and 
(IV) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare relied upon 
by the agency is not sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action 
under the circumstances. 
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement. 
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, dn agencv mav seek 
enforcement oi an order by seeking civil enforcement in the district 
courts 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an agencv's order must 
name, as defendants, each alleged violator against whom the agency 
seeks to obtain civil enforcement 
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(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order 
shall be determined by the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant, any of the follow-
ing: 
(i) declaratory relief; 
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief; 
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by law; or 
(iv) any combination of the foregoing. 
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or threatened by 
the failure of an agency to enforce an agency's order may timely file a 
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that order, but the action may not 
be commenced: 
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff has given notice of his 
intent to seek civil enforcement of the alleged violation to the agency 
head, the attorney general, and to each alleged violator against 
whom the petitioner seeks civil enforcement; 
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently prosecuting a complaint 
seeking civil enforcement of the same order against the same or a 
similarly situated defendant; or 
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the same order has been filed 
and is pending in court. 
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order must 
name, as defendants, the agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the 
agency that is vested with the power to enforce the order, and each al-
leged violator against whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement. 
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized by statute, a complaint 
seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order may not request, and the 
court may not grant, any monetary payment apart from taxable costs. 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's order, in addition to 
any other defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground 
that: 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency without 
jurisdiction to issue the order; 
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant; 
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or 
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied. 
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order 
are reviewable in the same manner as other civil cases. 
63-46b-20. Emergency adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency basis without comply-
ing with the requirements of this chapter if: 
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented to the agency show that 
an immediate and significant danger to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare exists; and 
(b) the threat requires immediate action by the agency. 
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency shall: 
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(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary to prevent or 
avoid the danger to the public health, safety, or welfare; 
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective immediately, that includes 
a brief statement of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for 
the agency's utilization of emergency adjudicative proceedings; and 
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who are required to comply 
with the order. 
(3) If the emergency order issued under this section will result in the con-
tinued infringement or impairment of any legal right or interest of any party, 
the agency shall commence a formal adjudicative proceeding in accordance 
with the other provisions of this chapter. 
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders. 
(1) Any person may file a request for agency action, requesting that the 
agency issue a declaratory order determining the applicability of a statute, 
rule, or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency to specified cir-
cumstances 
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that 
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of petitions for declaratory 
orders, 
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions, 
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which the agency will not 
issue a declaratory order; 
(d) are consistent with the public interest and with the general policy 
of this chapter; and 
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of reliable advice. 
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory order if. 
fi) the request is one of a class of circumstances that the agency 
has by rule defined as being exempt from declaratory orders; or 
• ii) the person requesting the declaratory order participated in an 
adjudicative proceeding concerning the same issue within 12 months 
of the date of the present request 
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order that would substantially 
prejudice the rights of a person who wpuld be a necessary party, only if 
that person consents in writing to the determination of the matter by a 
declaratory proceeding. 
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedings if 
(a) they meet the requirements of Section 63-46b-9, and 
(b) thev file timely petitions for intervention according to agency rules. 
(5) An agency may provide, by rule or order, that other provisions of Sec-
tions 63-46b-4 through 63-46b-13 apply to declaratory proceedings 
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory order, the agency may 
issue a written order 
(l) declaring the applicability ot the statute, rule, or order in ques-
tion to the specified circumstances, 
ui) setting the matter ior adjudicative proceedings, 
du) agreeing to issue a declaratorv order within a specified time; 
or 
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(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order and stating the reasons 
for its action. 
(b) A declaratory order shall contain: 
(i) the names of all parties to the proceeding on which it is based; 
(ii) the particular facts on which it is based; and 
(iii) the reasons for its conclusion. 
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a request for a declaratory 
proceeding shall be mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other par-
ties. 
(d) A declaratory order has the same status and binding effect as any 
other order issued in an adjudicative proceeding. 
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in writing to an extension, if 
an agency has not issued a declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of 
the petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied. 
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34-35-1. Short title. 
This shall be known and mav be cited as the "Utah Anti-Discriminatorv Act." 
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34-35-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Apprenticeship" means any program for the training of apprentices 
including, but not limited to, any program providing the training of those 
persons defined as apprentices by Section 35-8-5, whether or not such 
program is registered and approved by the Apprenticeship Council under 
Section 35-8-2. 
(2) "Bona fide occupational qualification" means a characteristic apply-
ing to an employee which is necessary to the operation or is the essence of 
his employer's business. 
(3) "Commission" means the Industrial Commission of the state of 
Utah, and "commissioner" means a member of that commission. 
(4) "Coordinator" or "director" means the individual who manages the 
enforcement of this chapter. 
(5) "Court" means the district court in the judicial district of the state of 
Utah in which the asserted unfair employment practice occurred, or if this 
court is not in session at tha t time, then any judge of the court. 
(6) "Employee" means any person applying with or employed by an 
employer. 
(7) "Employer" means the state or any political subdivision or board, 
commission, department, institution, school district, trust, or agent 
thereof, and every other person employing 15 or more employees within 
the state for each working day in each of 20 calendar weeks or more in the 
current or preceding calendar year; but it does not include religious 
organizations or associations, religious corporations sole, nor any corpo-
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ration or association constituting a wholly owned subsidiary or agency of 
any religious organization or association or religious corporation sole. 
(8) "Employment agency" means any person undertaking to procure 
employees or opportunities to work for any other person, or the holding 
itself out to be equipped to do so. 
(9) "Handicap" means a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of a person's major life activities. 
(10) "Joint apprenticeship committee" means any association of repre-
sentatives of a labor organization and an employer providing, coordinat-
ing, or controlling an apprentice training program. 
(11) "Labor organization" means any organization which exists for the 
purpose in whole or in part of collective bargaining or of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of 
other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment. 
(12) "National origin" means the place of birth, domicile, or residence of 
an individual or of an individual's ancestors. 
(13) "On-the-job-training" means any program designed to instruct a 
person who, while learning the particular job for which he is receiving 
instruction, is also employed at that job, or who may be employed by the 
employer conducting the program during the course of the program, or 
when the program is completed. 
(14) "Person" means one or more individuals, partnerships, associa-
tions, corporations, legal representatives, trusts or trustees, receivers, the 
state of Utah and all political subdivisions and agencies of the state. 
(15) "Presiding officer" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 63-46b-2. 
(16) "Prohibited employment practice" means a practice specified as 
discriminatory, and therefore unlawful, in Section 34-35-6. 
(17) "Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action by an employer, 
employment agency, labor organization, apprenticeship program, on-the-
job training program, or vocational school against one of its employees, 
applicants, or members because he has opposed any employment practice 
prohibited under this chapter or because he has filed charges, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any way in any proceeding, investigation, or 
hearing under this chapter. 
(18) "Vocational school" means any school or institution conducting a 
course of instruction, training, or retraining to prepare individuals to 
follow an occupation or trade, or to pursue a manual, technical, industrial, 
business, commercial, office, personal services, or other nonprofessional 
occupations. 
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34-35-3. Jur isdic t ion of Industr ial Commission — Cre-
ation of Antidiscrimination Division — Co-
ordinator of fair employment practices. 
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the subject of employment 
practices and discrimination made unlawful by this chapter. There is hereby 
created a division of the commission to be known and designated as the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division, which division shall be under the jurisdiction and 
direction of the commission. The division shall have as its immediate super-
visory head a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such co-ordinator 
shall be appointed by the commission. Any co-ordinator so appointed shall at 
all times be under the direct supervision and control of the commission. 
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34-35-4.5. Antidiscrimination Division Advisory Commit-
tee — Membership — Appointment — Term — 
Powers and duties — Chair. 
(1) There is created an Antidiscrimination Division Advisory Committee of 
not less than 11 nor more than 15 members appointed as follows: 
(a) The governor shall appoint: 
(i) one small business representative; 
(ii) one employer representative; 
(iii) one labor representative; and 
(iv) one representative of the Utah State Bar. 
(b) The governor shall appoint the remaining members: 
(i) to represent each of the following protected classes: race, color, 
national origin, gender, religion, age, and persons with disabilities; 
and 
(ii) to ensure equal representation on the board of employers and 
employees. 
(c) The director of the Utah Antidiscrimination Division shall be an ex 
officio nonvoting member and provide any necessary staff support for the 
committee. 
(2) (a) Six of the initial committee members shall be appointed for a 
two-year term beginning July 1 and ending June 30. The remaining initial 
committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms beginning July 
1 and ending June 30. The first term to begin July 1, 1994. 
(b) At the expiration of the term of a committee member or if a vacancy 
occurs on the committee, the governor shall appoint a replacement to the 
committee for a two-year term. 
(c) The governor shall terminate the term of a committee member who 
ceases to be representative as designated by the original appointment. 
(3) A committee member shall serve without pay, but is entitled to necessary 
expenses incurred in attending meetings called by the chair. 
(4) (a) The advisory committee shall offer advice on issues requested by the 
commission and the Legislature and also make recommendations to the 
commission and division regarding issues of employment discrimination 
and issues related to the administration of this chapter. 
(b) The committee shall confer at least quarterly for the purpose of 
advising the commission and the Legislature regarding issues of employ-
ment discrimination and issues related to the administration of this 
chapter. 
(5) The governor shall appoint a member of the committee to serve as chair. 
The chair is charged with the responsibility of calling the necessary meetings. 
34-35-5. Antidiscrimination Divis ion — Powers . 
(1) The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may: 
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators and other employ-
ees and agents that it considers necessary for the enforcement of this 
chapter; 
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(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules, consistent with, and for 
the enforcement of, this chapter; 
(c) receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging dis-
crimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job training 
programs, and vocational schools, or the existence of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice by a person, an employer, an employment 
agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members of an employ-
ment agency or labor organization, a joint apprenticeship committee, and 
vocational school; 
(d) investigate and study the existence, character, causes, and extent of 
discrimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job train-
ing programs, and vocational schools in this state by employers, employ-
ment agencies, labor organizations, joint apprenticeship committees, and 
vocational schools; 
(e) formulate plans for the elimination of discrimination by educational 
or other means; 
(f) hold hearings upon complaint made against a person, an employer, 
an employment agency, a labor organization or the employees or members 
of an employment agency or labor organization, a joint apprenticeship 
committee, or a vocational school; 
(g) issue publications and reports of investigations and research that 
will tend to promote good will among the various racial, religious, and 
ethnic groups of the state, and that will minimize or eliminate discrimi-
nation in employment because of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, 
age, or handicap; 
(h) prepare and transmit to the governor, at least once each year, 
reports describing its proceedings, investigations, hearings it has con-
ducted and the outcome of those hearings, decisions it has rendered, and 
the other work performed by it; 
(i) recommend policies to the governor, and submit recommendation to 
..employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations to implement 
those policies; 
(j) recommend any legislation concerning discrimination because of 
race, sex, color, national origin, religion, age, or handicap to the governor 
that it considers necessary; 
(k) within the limits of any appropriations made for its operation, 
cooperate with other agencies or organizations, both public and private, in 
the planning and conducting of educational programs designed to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices prohibited under this chapter; and 
(1) adopt an official seal. 
(2) The division shall investigate alleged discriminatory practices invoking 
officers or employees of state government if requested to do so by the Career 
Service Review Board. 
(3) (a) In any hearing held under the authority of this chapter, the division 
may: 
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance at the hearing; 
(ii) administer oaths and take the testimony of any person under 
oath; and 
(hi) compel any person to produce for examination any books, 
papers, or other information relating to the matters raised by the 
complaint. 
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(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings: 
(i) the commission; 
(ii) any commissioner; 
(iii) the coordinator; or 
(iv) a hearing examiner or agent appointed by the commission. 
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the 
commission, the commission may petition the district court to enforce the 
subpoena. 
(d) (i) No person may be excused from attending or testifying, or from 
producing records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in 
obedience to a subpoena issued by the commission under the author-
ity of this section on the ground that the evidence or the testimony 
required ^ a y tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or 
forfeiture. 
(ii) No person may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or 
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing 
concerning which he shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence 
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, except 
that a person testifying is not exempt from prosecution and punish-
ment for perjury. 
34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment practices 
— Permit ted practices, 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to discharge, 
demote, terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or 
discriminate in matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and 
conditions of employment against any person otherwise qualified, 
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, 
national origin, or handicap. No applicant nor candidate for any job or 
position may be considered "otherwise qualified," unless he possesses 
the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition 
to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations, and other job 
related qualifications required by an employer for any particular job, 
job classification, or position to be filled or created; 
(ii) as used in this chapter, "to discriminate in matters of compen-
sation" means the payment of differing wages or salaries to employees 
having substantially equal experience, responsibilities, and skill for 
the particular job. However, nothing in this chapter prevents in-
creases in pay as a result of longevity with the employer, if the salary 
increases are uniformly applied and available to all employees on a 
substantially proportional basis. Nothing in this section prohibits an 
employer and employee from agreeing to a rate of pay or work 
schedule designed to protect the employee from loss of Social Security 
payment or benefits if the employee is eligible for those payments; 
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(b) for an employment agency: 
(i) to refuse to list and properly classify for employment, or to 
refuse to refer an individual for employment, in a known available job 
for which the individual is otherwise qualified, because of race, color, 
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, 
national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap; 
(ii) to comply with a request from an employer for referral of 
applicants for employment if the request indicates either directly or 
indirectly that the employer discriminates in employment on account 
of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related condi-
tions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age 
or older, or handicap; 
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any individual otherwise qualified 
from full membership rights in the labor organization, or to expel the 
individual from membership in the labor organization, or to otherwise 
discriminate against or harass any of its members in full employment of 
work opportunity, or representation, because of race, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, 
if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap; 
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or labor organization to print, 
or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated, any statement, adver-
tisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment 
or membership, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective 
employment or membership, which expresses, either directly or indirectly, 
any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, religion, 
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, national ori-
gin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or intent 
to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination; unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or required by, and given to, an 
agency of government for security reasons; 
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer, an employment agency, 
a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite, 
compel, or coerce the doing of an act defined in this section to be a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice; or to obstruct or 
prevent any person from complying with this chapter, or any order issued 
under it; or to attempt, either directly or indirectly, to commit any act 
prohibited in this section; 
(f) for any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship commit-
tee, or vocational school, providing, coordinating, or controlling appren-
ticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or controlling on-the-job-
training programs, instruction, training, or retraining programs: 
(i) to deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person, because of 
race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related condi-
tions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age 
or older, or handicap the right to be admitted to, or participate in any 
apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training program, or 
other occupational instruction, training or retraining program; 
(ii) to discriminate against or harass any qualified person in that 
person's pursuit of such programs, or to discriminate against such a 
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such programs, 
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because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years 
of age or older, or handicap; 
(iii) to print, or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any 
notice or advertisement relating to employment by the employer, or 
membership in or any classification or referral for employment by a 
labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for 
employment by an employment agency, indicating any preference, 
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, color, sex, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, na-
tional origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or 
handicap except that a notice or advertisement may indicate a 
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related condi-
tions, age, national origin, or handicap when religion, race, color, sex, 
age, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation for employment. 
Nothing contained in Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(f) shall be construed to 
prevent the termination of employment of an individual who is physically, 
mentally, or emotionally unable to perform the duties required by that 
individual's employment, or to preclude the variance of insurance premiums, of 
coverage on account of age, or affect any restriction upon the activities of 
individuals licensed by the liquor authority with respect to persons under 21 
years of age. 
(2) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
(i) for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employ-
ment agency to classify or refer for employment any individual, for a 
labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual or for an employer, labor organization, or 
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or 
other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any indi-
vidual in any such program, on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or 
handicap in those certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if the individual is 40 
years of age or older, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise; 
(ii) for a school, college, university, or other educational institution 
to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if the school, 
college, university, or other educational institution is, in whole or in 
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a 
particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the 
curriculum of the school, college, university, or other educational 
institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion; 
(iii) for an employer to give preference in employment to his own 
spouse, son, son-in-law, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any person 
for whom the employer is or would be liable to furnish financial 
support if those persons were unemployed; or for an employer to give 
preference in employment to any person to whom the employer during 
the preceding six months has furnished more than one-half of total 
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financial support regardless of whether or not the employer was or is 
legally obligated to furnish support, or for an employer to give 
preference in employment to any person whose education or training 
was substantially financed by the employer for a period of two years 
or more 
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies to any business or 
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly 
announced employment practice of the business or enterprise under which 
preferential t reatment is given to any individual because he is a native 
American Indian living on or near an Indian reservation 
(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted to require any 
employer, employment agency, labor organization, vocational school, joint 
labor-management committee, or apprenticeship program subject to this 
chapter to grant preferential t reatment to any individual or to any group 
because of the race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap of 
the individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with 
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, 
religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed by any emplover, 
referred or classified for employment by an employment agencv or labor 
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organi-
zation or admitted to or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training 
program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of 
that race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any 
community or county or in the available work force in any community or 
county 
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice with respect to age to 
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employment 
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter except that no such emplovee 
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other statutory provision to the 
contrary, other than Subsection (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age 
is a bona tide occupational qualification no person shall be subject to 
involuntarv termination or retirement from employment on the basis of age 
alone if the individual is 40 years of age or older 
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement of an emplovee 
who has attained at least 65 years of age, and who, for the two vear period 
immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executne or a high 
pohc> making position, if that employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeit-
able annual retirement benefit from his employer's pension, profit sharing, 
savings, or deferred compensation plan, or any combination of those plans, 
which benefit equals in the aggregate, at least $44 000 
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34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim — 
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determina-
tion. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, make, 
sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or 
affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed 
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or 
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to 
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the 
commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance 
to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding, 
the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a 
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt 
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency 
action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct 
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and 
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency 
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the 
investigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to 
support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request-for agency action, the investigator shall 
formally report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a 
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding. 
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(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an eviden-
tiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the deter-
mination and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the 
investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to sup-
port the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
set out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally 
report these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issue a 
determination and order based on the investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within 30 
days of the date of the determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the deter-
mination and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to 
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to 
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the 
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he 
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the 
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and 
the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made 
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officer finds that 
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the 
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed 
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a 
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to cease 
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to 
the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all 
stages-of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order 
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the 
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection l l l)(a) is subject to 
judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning proce-
dures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
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(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make 
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation, 
or proceeding before the commission except in the following: 
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may 
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and 
participation in proceedings before the commission. 
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the iden-
tities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed. 
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general 
or other legal representatives of the state 01 commission. 
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting require-
ments of the federal government. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, 
retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, reli-
gion, national origin, or handicap. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based upon 
any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of 
any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in 
connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection 
is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision 
set forth in Subsection (15). 
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(1) The commission or the attorney general at the request of the commission 
shall commence an action under Section 63-46b-19 for civil enforcement of a 
final order of the commission issued under Subsection 34-35-7.1(12) if: 
(a) the order finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that a 
respondent has engaged or is engaging in discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practices made unlawful by this chapter; 
(b) counsel to the commission or the attorney general determines after 
reasonable inquiry that the order is well grounded in fact and is warranted 
by existing law; 
(c) the respondent has not received an order of automatic stay or 
discharge from the United States Bankruptcy Court; and 
(d) (P the commission has not accepted a conciliation agreement to 
which the aggrieved party and respondent are parties; or 
(ii) the respondent has not conciliated or complied with the final 
order of the commission within 30 days from the date the order is 
issued. 
(2) If the respondent seeks judicial review of the final order under Section 
63-46b-16, pursuant to Section 63-46b-18 the commission may stay seeking 
civil enforcement pending the completion of the judicial review. 
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EXHIBIT C 
UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE RULES, 
RULE 560-1, et seq. 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
R560. Anti-Discrimination. 
R560-1. Anti-Discrimination. 
R560-2. Pre-Employment Inquiry Guide. 
R560-3. Nondiscrimination Clause to be used in Con-
tracts Entered into by the State of Utah and its 
Agencies. 
R560-4. Advertising. 
R560-5. Employment Agencies. 
R560-6. Regulation of Practice and Procedure on Em-
ployer Reports and Records. 
R560-1. Anti-Discrimination. 
R560-I-1. Authority. 
R560-1-2. Definitions. 
R560-1-3. Procedures—Request for Agency Action 
and Investigation File. 
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making and 
Review. 
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Purpose of 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Rf>60-l-(). Declaratory Orders. 
R560-1-7. Time. 
R560-1-1. Author i ty . 
THis rule is established pursuant to Section 
34-35-2, U.C.A. 
R560-1-2. Definit ions. 
The following definitions are complementary to the 
statutory definitions specified in Section 34-35-2, 
U.C.A..and shall apply to all rules of R560. 
A. "Act" means the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965. prohibiting discriminatory or unlawful em-
ployment practices. 
B. "Charging partv" means the person who initi-
ated agency action. 
C "Commission" means the Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
I) "Director" means the Director, Utah Anti-Dis-
cnmination Division. 
E. "Division" means the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division. 
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F "Handicap" means a physical or mental impair 
ment which substantially limits one 01 more of an 
individual's major life activities 
1 Being regarded as having a handicap is equiva 
lent to being handicapped or having a handicap 
2 Having a record of an impairment substantially 
limiting one or more major life activities is equiva 
lent to being handicapped or having a handicap 
3 Major life activity means functions such as car-
ing for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
employment 
4 An individual will be considered substantially 
limited in the major life activity of employment or 
working if the individual is likely to experience diffi-
culty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employ 
ment because of a handicap 
5 Has a record of such an impairment means has a 
history of, or has been regarded as having, a mental 
or physical impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activity 
6 Is regarded as having an impairment means 
a has a physical or mental impairment that does 
not substantially limit major life activities but is 
treated as constituting such a limitation, 
b has a physical or mental impairment that sub 
stantially limits major life activities only as a result 
of the att i tudes of others toward such an impairment 
or 
c has none of the impairments listed in the defini 
tion of physical or mental impairment above but is 
treated as having such an impairment 
G "He, His, Him or Himself shall refer to either 
sex 
H "Investigator shall mean the individual desig 
nated by the Commission or Director to investigate 
complaints alleging discriminatory or prohibited em 
ployment practices 
I "Qualified handicapped individual' means a 
handicapped individual who with reasonable accom 
modation can perform the essential functions of the 
job in question 
J 'Reasonable accommodation For the purpose of 
enforcement of these rules and regulations the follow 
ing criteria will be utilized to determine a reasonable 
accommodation 
1 An employer shall make reasonable accommoda 
tion to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or em 
ployee unless the employer can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose i n undue hardship on 
the operation of its program 
2 Reasonable accommodation mav include 
a making facilities used bv the employees rcadilv 
accessible to and useable bv handicapped individuals 
and 
b job restructuring modified work schedules ac 
quisition or modification of equipment or devices and 
other similar actions 
3 In determining pursuant to Rule R560 1 2 J 1 
whether an accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of an employer factors to 
be considered include 
a the overall size of the emplo\ers program with 
respect to number of employees number and type of 
facilities and size of budget, 
b the type of the employers operation, including 
the composition and structure of the employers work 
force, and 
c the nature and cost of the accommodation 
needed 
4 An employer may not deny an employment op-
portunity to a qualified handicapped employee or ap-
plicant if the basis for the denial is the need to make 
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental 
limitations of the employee or applicant 
5 Each complaint will be handled on a case by-case 
basis because of the variable nature of handicap and 
potential accommodation 
K The Division adopts the federal EEOC guide-
lines on sexual harassment as specified in 29 CFR 
Section 1604 11 
R560-1-3. Procedures—Request for Agency Ac-
tion and Investigation File. 
A CONTENTS OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY AC-
TION 
A request for agency action as specified in Section 
34-35 7 1, U C A , shall be filed at the Division office 
on a form designated by the Division The completed 
form shall include all information required by Section 
63 46b 3(3), U C A 
B FILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION 
1 A request for agency action must be filed within 
180 davs after the alleged discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice occurred 
2 A request for agency action shall be filed either 
bv personal delivery or regular mail addressed to the 
Divisions office in Salt Lake City, Utah 
3 Investigators and any other persons designated 
by the Commission, shall be available to assist in the 
drafting and filing of requests for agency action at the 
Division s office during normal business hours 
C RESPONSE/ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR 
AGENCY ACTION 
1 The Division shall mail a copy of the request for 
agencv action to the charging party and the respon-
dent/employer within ten working days of the filing 
of the request for agency action 
2 The respondent must answer the allegations of 
discrimination or prohibited employment practice set 
out in the request for agencv action in writing within 
ten working davs of receipt of the request for agency 
action The response/answer shall be mailed to the 
Division office 
D AMENDMENT O r REQUEST FOR AGENCY 
ACTION 
1 All allegations of discrimination or prohibited 
employment practice set out in the request for agency 
action mav be amendeel, either by the Commission or 
the charging party prior to commencement of an evi 
dentiarv hearing and the respondent may amend its 
answer Amendments made during or after an evi 
dentiarv hearing mav be made onlv with the permis 
sion of the presiding officer The Commission shall 
permit liberal amendment of requests for agency ac 
tion and filing of supplemental requests for agency 
action in order to accomplish the purpose of the Act 
2 Amendments or a supplemental request for 
agencv action shall be in writing, or on forms fur 
nished bv the Division signed and verified Copieb 
shall be filed in the same manner as in the case of 
original requests for agenc\ action 
3 Amendments or a supplemental request for 
agencv action shall be served on the respondent as in 
the«case of an original request for agencv action 
4 A request for agencv action or a supplemental 
request for agencv action mav be withdrawn by the 
charging pirtv prior to the issuance of a final order 
L MAILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY AC 
TION 
The mailing specified in Section 63 46b 3(3), 
U C A shall be pertormed bv the Division and the 
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rsons known to have a direct interest in the re-
ested agency action as specified in Section 
53.46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party 
and the respondent/employer 
F CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR 
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES ACT 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A , the proce-
dures specified in Section 34-35-7 l(l)-(5), U.C.A., are 
informal process with no hearing and are gov-
erned by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement 
conferences scheduled pursuant to Section 
34 35-7 l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings. 
G. PRESIDING OFFICER 
for those procedures specified in Section 
34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be 
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding 
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section 
34-35-7.1(6)-(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the 
Commission. 
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making 
and Review. 
The following rules pertain to the procedures speci-
fied in Section 34-35-7.1, U C A. 
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial 
Determination and Order, the following provisions 
and those of Section 63-46b-12. U C A., shall applv 
1 The initial Determination and Order of the Divi-
sion, after the completion of an investigation on a 
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Direc-
tor. The Director may request that the Commission's 
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a 
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance 
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director 
may refer a request for agency action back to an in-
vestigator for further investigation when necessary. 
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4 A 1 
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final 
Commission Oiders until either the time to file a 
written request to the Director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the Director's Determina-
tion and Order has expired or until the Order is af-
firmed in a Commission Order on review per Section 
63-46b-12, U C A 
3 A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be 
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30 
days oFthe date of the initial Determination and Or-
der 
4 A request for an evidentiary hearing must state 
a reason why the hearing is necessarv A hearing will 
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not 
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed 
difierentlv In most cases, the need to cross-examine 
the individuals who have submitted affidavits sup-
portive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for 
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission 
5 Either party may file a written request for re-
view of the presiding officer's Order in accordance 
with Section (>3-46b-12, U C A 
B Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimi-
nation, whether risk of future injury or increased cost 
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to 
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of 
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis subject to the following limitations 
1 The respondentyemployer seeking to use the de-
fense of risk of future injury must provide reliable 
medical evidence showing a causal connection be-
tween the increased risk of future injury and the 
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk. 
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of increased cost of insurance premium must 
show with verified documentary evidence that a sig-
nificant insurance premium increase would occur if 
the charging party were hired or remained in the 
position at issue. 
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on 
federal case law regarding discrimination in inter-
preting the Act in cases where the federal law being 
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and 
where state law interpretation is non-existent. 
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Pur-
pose of Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 
34-35-7.l(6)-( 10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative 
hearing which shall occur following the investigation 
process referred to in Section 34-35-7. l(l)-(5), U.C.A. 
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director 
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the 
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the require-
ments imposed by Rule R560-1-4 A.3 and 4 have been 
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to 
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. 
R560-1-6. Dec la ra tory O r d e r s . 
A PURPOSE 
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule pro-
vides the procedures for submission, review, and dis-
position of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on 
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders gov-
erning or issued by the agency. 
B. PETITION FORM AND FILING 
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to 
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the 
date of receipt. 
2 The petition shall. 
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency 
Declaratory Order; 
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be re-
viewed, 
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances 
in which applicability is to be reviewed; 
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability 
review, addressing in particular why the review 
should not be considered frivolous; 
(e) include an address and telephone where the pe-
titioner can be contacted during regular work days, 
(0 declare whether the petitioner has participated 
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding 
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months; 
and 
(g) be signed bv the petitioner 
C REVIEWABILITY 
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declar-
a t o r Order that is 
1 not within the jurisdiction and competence of the 
agencv, 
2 trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial, or 
3 otherwise excluded bv state or federal law. 
D PETITION REVIEW" AND DISPOSITION 
1 The Director shall promptly review and consider 
the petition and m a y 
(a) meet with the petitioner, 
<b) consult with Legal Counsel, or 
(c) take any action consistent with law that the 
agency deems necessary to provide the petition ade-
quate review and due consideration. 
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2. The Director may issue an order pursuant to Sec-
tion 63-46b-21(6), U.C.A. 
E. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
Review of a Declaratory Order is per Section 
63-46b-13, U.C.A., only. 
R560-1-7. Time. 
A. An Order is deemed issued on the date on the 
face of the Order which is the date the presiding offi-
cer signs the Order. 
B. In computing any period of time prescribed or 
allowed by these rules or by applicable statute: 
1. The day of the act, event, finding, or default, or 
the date an Order is issued, shall not be included; 
2. The last day of the period so computed shall be 
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a state 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until 
the end of the next working day; 
3. When the period of time prescribed is less than 
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and 
state legal holidays shall be excluded in the computa-
tion; 
4. No additional time for mailing will be allowed. 
1993 34-35-1 et seq., 63-46b-l ct seq. 
EXHIBIT D 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Felix Jensen 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lak0 County Utah 
MAR 2 8 1994 
By_L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI?$Uty C,erk 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
DIVISION and FELIX JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 930905232 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was heard on March 7, 1994. 
Plaintiff was represented by Glenn G. Hanni. Defendants were 
represented by Alan Hennebold. The Court read the Memoranda filed, 
heard oral argument and took the matter under advisement. 
Defendant Felix Jensen had filed a discrimination claim 
against plaintiff and defendant Industrial Commission ruled in his 
favor. Plaintiff seeks a judicial review by trial de novo of the 
Commission's ruling. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. 
Defendants contend that plaintiff had not exhausted its 
administrative remedies or filed its action for judicial review 
timely. 
The Court has reviewed Utah Code Ann., Sections 34-35-7.1, 34-
35-7.1(5), 34-35-7.1(11), and 63-46b-12, and has concluded that the 
Commission has correctly interpreted the procedure that should be 
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followed in the processing of claims such as the claim filed by Mr. 
Stevens. The Court does not believe that it was the intent of the 
legislature to create a situation wherein an aggrieved party could 
obtain a judicial review of a director's ruling without first 
having an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's 
ruling. It is evident that the legislature intended to create an 
administrative body that had the expertise to adjudicate claims 
without the necessity of resorting to the courts except to appeal 
from a final adjudicative order. 
The plaintiff's contention that there is a conflict between 
the Anti-Discrimination Act and the Administrative Procedures Act 
is a matter of interpretation on the part of the party who seeks to 
avoid the consequences of the Anti-Discrimination Act. The 
procedure to be followed in the Anti-Discrimination Act leaves 
little doubt that an aggrieved party cannot allow 30 days to elapse 
so as to make the director's order to become a final agency action 
which would allow for forum shopping between the Commission and the 
courts. If the aggrieved party does not follow the procedure 
adopted by the Commission, the aggrieved party is barred from 
judicial review because the aggrieved party has failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies. 
00113 
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The Court has not attempted to write an exhaustive Memorandum 
because defendant's Memoranda adequately reflects the Court's views 
on the issues presented in this case. 
The Court did not deem it necessary to address the issue of 
timeliness of plaintiff's filing its Complaint, because plaintiff 
failed to request a hearing before the Commission, 
Defendant shall prepare the Order in accordance with this 
decision. 
Dated this day of March, 1994. 
vyv^— A -k rz-kcJ1^ 
JOHN)A. ROKICH " 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this 2Q day of 
March, 1994: 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9 Exchange Place, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Alan Hennebold 
Attorney for Defendant Industrial Comm 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Felix E. Jensen 
Pro se 
2060 Brewer 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Lw< &<MT 
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FILED iK .ERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
Alan Hennebold-4740 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Telephone: (801) 530-6937 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE * 
INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
* 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
V 3 • #~ 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP * 
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION * 
DIVISION and FELIX JENSEN, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah having moved to dismiss the 
Complaint of Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, and the Court having received and reviewed the parties' 
respective memoranda on that issue, and having further heard the 
parties' oral argument in open court on March 7, 1994, and the 
Court having then issued its Memorandum Decision on March 28, 1994, 
granting Defendant Industrial Commission's Motion To Dismiss, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff State Farm Mutual 
has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah 
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that as a 
consequence of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative 
remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
APR 2 8 1994 
By AL *bct 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASE NO. 930905232 CV 
Order Granting Motion To Dismiss 
State Farm v. Industrial Commission 
Case No. 930905232 CV 
Page Two 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's 
Complaint in this matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
1994. DATED t h i s Jj^sday of /jagjj/ 
BY THE COURT: 
OTOHty A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
mi 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ah\930905232 
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EXHIBIT E 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Brenda Mena 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State Farm Mutual Automobile, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 930905022 CV 
vs. : 
: JUDGE Frank G. Noel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Division and : 
Brenda Mena, 
Defendants. : 
The court has reviewed defendant's Motion to Dismiss together with the memos filed in 
connection therewith, has heard oral argument and having taken the matter under advisement 
now rules as follows: 
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure by plaintiff to exhaust 
its administrative remedies. The court does so for the following reasons: 
The court will not attempt a recitation of all the facts inasmuch as they are essentially 
undisputed and are adequately recited in the memos filed by the parties. It is sufficient to simply 
state that plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter "State Farm") 
seeks judicial review of informal action taken by the Industrial Commission of Utah under the 
Anti-Discrimination Act. (Section 4-35-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953.) 
This statute sets out the procedure to be followed by an aggrieved party. In very general terms 
it is basically a five step process as follows: 
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Step 1: A party claimed to be aggrieved files a request for agency action. 
Step 2: An investigator is appointed who attempts a settlement and reconciliation between 
the parties. 
Step 3: If no settlement is reached then an informal investigation is conducted and the 
director issues an order based on the results of the investigation. 
Step 4: An aggrieved party may then request an evidentiary hearing before a presiding 
officer. (The procedure at this point ceases to be an informal process and 
becomes a formal adjudication.) 
Step 5: Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing an aggrieved party may request a review 
of the presiding officer's order within the agency as per the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act Section 63-46b-12. 
The act further provides that judicial review of this process is available to those who have 
filed a request for a review within the agency under Step 5 above. 
State Farm elected to seek a de novo review by this court after the initial informal 
investigation report and order by the director under Step 3 above. State Farm argues that up 
to this point the proceedings are informal and that therefore it is entitled to seek judicial review 
in this court under Section 63-46b-15, which provision vests this court with jurisdiction for de 
novo review of final agency action resulting from informal proceedings. 
This court is of the opinion that by not following all of the steps outlined in the Anti-
Discrimination Act State Farm did not exhaust its remedies. It did not request an evidentiary 
hearing, which was available to it, and thereafter request an intra agency review of the results 
of that evidentiary hearing. State Farm argues that if it cannot choose to opt out of the statutory 
procedure at the point where informal proceedings become formal then it will never be able to 
get a de novo hearing in the District Court under Section 63-46b-15. The answer to this 
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argument is that if the agency procedure provides the parties with an opportunity for an 
evidentiary hearing at the agency level with the opportunity to present evidence, cross examine, 
etc., and the hearing complies with the Administrative Procedures Act for formal adjudicative 
proceedings resulting in an adequate record that is reviewable by the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals, then there is no need for a de novo review in District Court. That is the case 
here. The Anti-Discrimination Act establishes a specific, well thought-out, step by step 
procedure. State Farm cannot elect to opt out along the way, allow the time to expire for 
invoking its rights under the next step and thereby claim "final action" by the agency and then 
seek judicial review. 
State Farm points to Section 63-46b-15(l)(a) which provides: 
"The District Courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de 
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings...." 
To interpret this provision as State Farm suggests however would create an inconsistency 
with Section 63-46b-14 which provision codifies a fundamental tenet of administrative law that 
parties are entitled to judicial review only after they have exhausted all administrative remedies. 
This court is of the opinion that a better interpretation of 63-46b-15 and an interpretation 
consistent with the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, under the facts of this case, is that there was 
no final agency action inasmuch as the statutory procedure provided for further remedies 
including the right to seek an evidentiary hearing. Section 63-46b-15, therefore, seems to 
contemplate a situation where an aggrieved party has exhausted all of the remedies available to 
it within a particular agency and that the final action of the agency is a culmination of informal 
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proceedings. In that circumstance then there would be final agency action resulting from 
informal adjudicative proceedings. 
The Anti-IMscrimination Act itself provides specifically for judicial review after all of 
the steps in its adjudicative process have been completed. Section 34-35-7. l(12)(a) provides: 
"An order of the commission under subsection (ll)(a) [Step 5 
above] is subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-
16." (Formal adjudications) 
In Maverick v. Industrial Commission. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, the Supreme Court held, 
under this same statute, that if an aggrieved party did not take the final step of requesting review 
of the evidentiary hearing then they would not be entitled to judicial review. 
Accordingly, the court is of the opinion that State Farm has not exhausted its 
administrative remedies and that therefore this court is without jurisdiction. In light of this 
ruling the court does not feel it necessary to rule on the other issues presented in the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it to 
opposing Counsel for approval as to form and then to this court for signature. 
Dated this ^ c ^ d a y of March, 1994. 
0 0 J 4 J 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, postage prepaid, to the following on this £^rU< day of March, 1994. 
Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Sharon J. Eblen 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
Daniel S. Sam 
Attorney for Defendant Mena 
889 North Freedom Blvd., Suite 102 
Provo, UT 84604 
r r^ 71 n^Cr V v ~ - - * - W A ^ 
Alan Hennebold-4740 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Telephone: (801) 530-6937 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE * 
INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
* 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION * 
DIVISION and BRENDA MENA, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah having moved to dismiss the 
Complaint of Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, and the Court having received and reviewed the parties' 
respective memoranda on that issue, and having further heard the 
parties' oral argument in open court on March 18, 1994, and the 
Court having then issued its Memorandum Decision on March 22, 1994, 
granting Defendant Industrial Commission's Motion To Dismiss, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff State Farm Mutual 
has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah 
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that as a 
consequence of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative 
remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Order Granting Motion To Dismiss 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's 
Complaint in this matter is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of 7, 1994. 
Daniel S. Sam 
Attorney for Defendant Mena 
BY THE COURT: 
FKAJMK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Approved as to form: 
EvarTX. ^Schintrhz 
David G. T u r c o t t e 
A t t o r n e y s fo r Defendant Mena 
ah \930905022 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the proposed ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS in the case of STATE FARM 
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY V. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH ANDTIDISCRIMINATION DIVISION and BRENDA MENA. Case Number 
930905022, on the 12th day of April, 1994, to the following: 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
6th Floor, Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daniel S. Sam 
Attorney for Defendant Mena 
889 N. Freedom Blvd. #102 
Provo, Ut. 84604 
XIJL 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
uuJ45 
Alan Hennebold-4740 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 3 00 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Telephone: (801) 530-6937 wpd.y Gioffc 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
DIVISION and BRENDA MENA, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASE NO. 930905022 CV 
The Industrial Commission of Utah having moved to dismiss the 
Complaint of Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, and the Court having received and reviewed the parties' 
respective memoranda on that issue, and having further heard the 
parties' oral argument in open court on March 18
 f 1994, and the 
Court having then issued its Memorandum Decision on March 22, 1994, 
granting Defendant Industrial Commission's Motion To Dismiss, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff State Farm Mutual 
has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah 
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that as a 
consequence of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative 
remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
Order Granting Motion To Dismiss 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's 
Complaint in this matter is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this^Hr day of A/$l 1 , 1994 
nn C. Hann 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
: / / « — j 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Daniel S. Sam 
Attorney for Defendant Mena 
